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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in computer and communication technol-
ogy have made it feasible for recorded musical works to be transferred
over telephone lines from one computer to another. These develop-
ments have alarmed many copyright owners who fear their works will
be freely disseminated over the so-called Information Superhighway
- or Internet' - without remuneration. This comment explores the
issues surrounding copyright protection of recorded musical works
made available on the Internet.
This comment begins in part II with an overview of the current
technology that makes dissemination of musical works over telephone
lines possible, as well as how this technology is being used. Part IlI
examines current copyright protection for musical works under the
1976 Copyright Act and concludes that the Act is indeed viable in the
face of new technology. Continuing to address the legislative role in
protecting the interests of copyright owners, part IV evaluates pro-
posed changes to the relevant copyright law, finding some to be help-
ful and others not. Finally, in part V, this comment concludes with a
discussion of the absence of judicial guidance in establishing whether
on-line services, bulletin board operators or computer users are re-
sponsible for copyright infringement. While current judicial and pro-
1. The Internet is actually only part of what is commonly referred to as "Cyberspace," the
"Information Superhighway," or the "National Information Infrastructure." These terms may
also include all the individual bulletin board services linked to the Internet, facsimile machines,
fiber optic cable, etc. WORKiNG GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OF THE WHITE
HousE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FoRCE, INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY AND THE NA-
TIONAL INFORmATiON INFRAsrRucruRs, at 5 (1995) [hereinafter NIl REPORT]. This comment
uses the terms "Internet" and "Cyberspace" to refer to the systems and computers through which
digital information may be transferred.
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posed legislative actions fail to adequately address the use and
potential for disseminating musical works via telephone lines, a broad,
literal interpretation of the 1976 Copyright Act provides a solid basis
from which to address the legal complications created by advancing
technology.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF DIGITAL Music DISSEMINATION
A. An Overview
1. The Lawless Internet
The Internet, in its simplest sense, is a large network of smaller
computer networks through which users of home computers can com-
municate, via telephone lines, with one another and with large com-
puter data bases containing a vast array of information.2 This network
of people and information is conspicuously without regulation; there is
no Internet authority that polices on-line communications.3 Without a
unified governing body, there simply are not many rules in the elec-
tronic environment commonly referred to as "cyberspace." 4
Cyberspace has bred an entitlement philosophy in Internet users.
The prevailing dogma is that anything available over the Internet -
text, graphics, music, software, etc. - is free, or at least should be.'
This attitude, combined with the relative ease with which music can
2. Lynne Curry, Computers: Compuserve Left to Face the Music; The Leading Network
Service Provider is Facing Legal Action from a US Publisher, INDEPm, DNrr, May 27, 1994, at
29. See also ED KROL, THE WHOLE Irr RNET 13 (1992). The author provides a more technical
definition of the Internet:
What comprises the Internet is a difficult question; the answer changes over time.
Five years ago the answer would have been easy: "All the networks, using the
[Internet Protocol], that cooperate to form a seamless network for their collective
users." . ."
More recently, some non-IP-based networks saw that the Internet was good. They
wanted to provide its services to their clientele. So they developed methods of
connecting these "strange" networks (e.g., Bitnet, DECnets, etc.) to the Internet.
At first these connections, called gateways, merely served to transfer electronic
mail between the two networks. Some, however, have grown to full service trans-
lators between the networks. Are they part of the Internet? Maybe yes and
maybe no. It depends on whether, in their hearts, they want to be.
3. KROL, supra note 2, at 13 ("The Internet has no president, chief operating officer, or
Pope. The constituent networks may have presidents and CEOs, but that's a different issue;
there's no single authority figure for the Internet as a whole.").
4. Ken Terry, When It Comes to Monitoring Music and Regulating Rights, New Media
May Present Technological Diffculties, BiLLaoARD, May 7, 1994, at 80. See also Rory J.
O'Connor, Cyberspace Copyright Aid Urged, SAN JosMERcuRY NEws, Oct. 5, 1995, at Cl, C8
(discussing the Cyberspace Law Institute's suggestion that a private arbitration board should be
developed to resolve on-line copyright disputes).
5. Lauren Gibbons Paul, Copyright Law: What's Legal, What's Not; PC Week Special
Report: On-line Services, PC WK, Mar. 28, 1994, at 82.
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be made available on the Internet, means that in cyberspace, copy-
righted music is readily available, usually for free and without
authorization.'
2. The Free Availability of Copyrighted Works
The controversy concerning copyright protection has to some ex-
tent arisen because of how well the Internet works. This information
superhighway is intended "to be a high-capacity electronic network
[for] delivering movies, books, musical recordings, photos and
software to computers, telephones, televisions and fax machines
across the country."7 Perhaps the current technology works too well.
Recent developments in digital technology have caused panic in many
who wish to protect their musical works from widespread, unremuner-
ated dissemination.8 With only a few strokes on the keyboard, a com-
puter user can deliver extremely accurate copies of digitized works to
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of individuals who have accessed the
Internet through their home computers.9
As a result, there are literally hundreds of locations on the In-
temet, known as "sites," .newsgroups," or "bulletin boards," t where
digitized music can be either given away or acquired for free - with-
out the copyright owners' permission.11 The Internet may also be
used to deliver recorded music legitimately - with the copyright
owners' permission. Many in the music industry believe that digital
6. Marc Peyser, Thoroughly Modem Music, NEWSWEEK, June 27, 1994, at 52.
7. Sandra Sugawara, What's Out of Line, When On Line? White House Report Says
Copying of Computer Service Files May Be Illegal, WASH. PosT, July 7, 1994, at D9.
8. N. Jansen Calamita, Coming to Terms with the Celestial Jukebox: Keeping the Sound
Recording Copyright Viable in the Digital Age, 74 B.U. L. REV. 505, 507 (1994).
9. Sugawara, supra note 7.
10. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
11. E.g., Terry, supra note 4 ("Thus it's not surprising that electronic bulletin-board users
have been exchanging digitized music without paying songwriters and publishers."); Andrew
Brown, Computers: From Private Property to Public Secrets, INDEPENDENT, May 27, 1994, at 29
("Out on the anarchic Interet, there are numerous 'newsgroups' whose sole raison d'Etre is
exchanging copyrighted sounds or pictures."); Derek Slater, Cyberspace and the Law; Legal
Expert Edward Cavazos Warns IS Chiefs to Safeguard Their Companies from On-line Abuses -
or End Up in Court, CoMn'rRwoRLD, Dec. 5, 1994, at 114 ("There are sites on the Internet
where pirated material is available, whether it be software or copyrighted audio."); Pauline Tam,
An On-line Link To Top Tunes Is Soon To Boom: On-line: Music Industry Faces Anarchy of the
Internet Independents, VANCOUVER SUN, Aug. 2, 1994, at C4 ("A growing number of databases
on computer networks, known as on-line music distribution services, allow music fans to listen
to a song and even record it free of charge - all without leaving your home."); David Landis,
Catching Some Entertainment, in Bits and Pieces, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 1994, at 8D ("Sound
clips and still photos have long been swapped in cyberspace by hackers, who would copy them
from their original source (a CD, video or photo) and upload them to computer bulletin boards.
Usually this was done without the publishers' permission.").
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music delivery may someday displace traditional retail sales.12 More-
over, with technological advances, those using computer networks
could begin creating and distributing recorded music in competition
with record companies and stores.13 It is therefore incumbent on both
the music industry and the legal profession to sort out what protection
is available to copyright owners 4 and how to enforce it.' 5
3. A Challenge to Copyright Law
Although it seems clear that digital dissemination of music is the
wave of the future, it has been said that "the future is not going to
arrive until there's legislation to protect the artist's copyright."' 6 To
many, it appears that the current law has not kept pace with the rapid
changes taking place in electronic communications.' 7 Some compa-
nies hesitate to deliver their products over the information superhigh-
12. E.g., Alice Rawsthom, Media Futures: Elvis Found in Cyberspace - Digital Juke-
boxes Are Set to Have a Big Impact on the Music Industry, FiN. TnMsS, Nov. 21, 1994, at 15
(quoting Sara John, director of legal affairs for BPI [British Phonographic Industry]) ("There's
no doubt that at some stage digital diffusion will become a major part of the music market. My
personal opinion is that it could happen very, very quickly.") (The author also notes that BPI's
research suggests that once people have access to on-line services such as digital cable radio,
their expenditure on compact discs and cassettes declines dramatically.). But cf Nick Rosen,
Royalties Boost for Internet Music, GuAR~wr, Nov. 14, 1994 at 3 [hereinafter Rosen, Royalties
Boost] (quoting Tom Curran, head of direct marketing at Bertlesman Music Group) ("In the very
long term ... they may be right that people will be receiving and buying and editing music in the
comfort of their own home. Whether consumers en masse are ready now for these develop-
ments, I don't know.").
13. Peyser, supra note 6.
14. Mark Bemiker, Copyrights Create Internet Problems, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
March 27, 1995, at 46 (quoting Neil Friedman, an attorney with Pepper & Corazzini, a Washing-
ton, D.C. communications law firm) (Music is a source of particularly complex rights problems
in the on-line context because "publishers, composers, artists and record companies all have
different rights.").
15. Neil Strauss, The Pop Life; Hit Makers Warily Explore the Computer Frontier, N.Y.
Tm.ms, July 6, 1994, at C9 ("More urgent is the matter of copyright. On the vast information
network known as Internet, music fans have been making songs by popular acts available free for
some time.").
16. Joel Selvin, Aerosmith Dives Into Network First Major-Label Song Release Via Com-
puter, S.F. CHRON., June 28, 1994, at El (quoting Geffen Records Publicity Director Bryn Bri-
denthal); Michael D. McCoy & Needham J. Boddie, II, Cybertheft: Will Copyright Law Prevent
Digital Tyranny on the Superhighway?, 30 WAKE FoRFsr L. Ra,. 169, 171 (1995) ("Given the
vital importance of an integrated superhighway, government likely will take certain regulatory
steps to garner industry support. Revising the current copyright laws may provide the necessary
protection to prevent technological isolation.").
17. E.g., KROL, supra note 2, at 39:
The law surrounding electronic communication has not kept pace with the tech-
nology. If you have a book, journal, or personal letter, you can ask almost any
lawyer or librarian if you can copy or use it in a particular manner. They can tell
you if you can, or whose permission you need to obtain. Ask the same question
regarding a network bulletin board posting, an electronic mail message, or a re-
port in a file available on the network, and they will throw up their hands ...
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way and are concerned that their copyrighted works will not be
adequately protected.1"
At the heart of the problem is how to adequately protect copy-
righted information once it is on the Internet?19 A necessary precursor
to that question is whether current copyright law extends to the digital
dissemination of music in the first place.20 In order to explore these,
and related questions, this comment will first lay a foundation focus-
ing on the current technology being used to disseminate digitized
music.
B Technology: Digital Dissemination via the Internet
1. Moving Digitized Music in Cyberspace
In brief, computer users can use the Internet to access bulletin
boards"1 and forums, 2 from which they can download 3 music stored
Just be aware that this is a murky part of law which will likely be hammered out
in the next decade.
18. See, eg., Sugawara, supra note 7; Steve Traiman, Publishers, Music Licensing Groups
Seek Rights On Info Superhighway, BILLoBAD, June 10, 1995 (quoting Edward Murphy, presi-
dent and C.E.O. of the National Music Publishers' Association and the Harry Fox Agency, the
mechanical-rights collection arm of the NMPA) ("There are just too many holes in the
Internet!).
19. Sabra Chartrand, Patents, N.Y. Tims, March 28, 1994, at D2 (quoting Charlene Van-
lier, a lawyer and vice-president for ABC) ("How do you protect your copyright once your stuff
is 6n the national information infratructure?... If you agree to give your product to the system,
you must ask how will it control distribution so I get reimbursed? How will it protect against
alteration?"). See also Michael C. Lasky, Copyright, Trademark Issues to Confront PR Pros in
Cyberspace, PR SERVICES, April 1995, at 70 ("Citing increased use of the Interet, some elec-
tronic publishers believe copyright is dead. Entire novels can be scanned onto the Internet with-
out anyone knowing who put the copyrighted work on the Internet. There's also no way of
knowing who has accessed the copyrighted work."); Nicholas Negroponte, The Bit Police; What
Role Remains for Regulation of Media Created by Formless Data?, RECORDER, May 8, 1995, at
S46 ("Copyright law is totally out of date. It is a Gutenberg artifact. Since it is reactive process,
it will probably have to break down completely before it is corrected.').
20. See infra part III. See generally, Kenneth D. Suzan, Comment, Tapping to the Beat of
a Digital Drummer: Fine Tuning U.S. Copyright Law for Music Distribution on the Internet, 59
ALB. L. Rav. 789, 790 (1995) (taking the position that the "current copyright system is inade-
quate to handle the consequences of placing digitized recordings over the Interet").
21. A bulletin board is a computer system that acts as an information and message-passing
center for users to access over a telephone line linked by a modem to their own computer.
Curry, supra note 2, at 29; see also CoPYRorr L.L, Aug.-Sept., 1994 at 58. In the comment
following a summary of Playboy v. Frena, 839 F.Supp. 1552, 1555 (M.D. Fla. 1993), the follow-
ing definition is provided:
An electronic bulletin board consists of storage media, e.g., computer memories
or hard disks, connected to telephone lines via devices known as modems and
controlled by a computer. Users of electronic bulletin boards can transfer
(upload) information, data, and other material from their own computer to the
bulletin board's storage media, and they can also retrieve (download) information
from the bulletin board to their own computer memories.
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in a digital form called MIDI 4 However, before music can be re-
ceived, stored, and manipulated by a computer, it must be converted
into a digital representation that a computer can process. 25 Musical
instruments, including one's vocal chords, produce a series of sound
waves that cause similar vibrations on the human eardrum.26 Various
forms of media, including phonograph records or audio tapes, may be
used to record the sound waves.27 Music can be recorded in analog
form, reflecting the wave vibrations, much like the grooves of a rec-
ord.28  Additionally, music can be recorded in digital form, which a
computer can process. A digital recording is made by assigning digi-
tal codes to the various points along a sound wave.29 The sound
waves are time-sliced into brief segments of information that are ex-
pressed as binary numbers.3 0 The industry standard for converting
music into corresponding digital data is called MIDr' for Musical
Instrument Digital Interface.3" A MIDI file can be recorded in the
memory of a computer and then saved on a disk or transferred to some
other form of recordable medium.32 Once music is in digital form, a
computer user desiring to place the digitized music onto the Internet
usually accesses the Internet with a computer modem.33 Finally, a
sound card is necessary to give the computer audio capability.34
22. A forum is an electronic system that divides "up information and discussions into
forums or conferences each covering a separate topic or subject area." Curry, supra note 2, at
29.
23. To download is "[to load a data file or program into a computer system from a com-
puter network." Id.
24. MIDI stands for Musical Instrument Digital Interface. Id.
25. A. KoHn' & BoB Ko-ns, Ta ART OF Music LicENsiNG, 803 (Fifth edition) (1994).
26. Id at 804.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id The binary numbering system is used to store data in a computer.
31. Music Publishers File Class-Action Against CompuServe for Infringement, BNA PAT.,
TRADmAuC & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY, Dec. 27, 1993 [hereinafter BNA, Music Publishers].
32. Id. See also Plaintiff's Complaint, at 6, flh. **, Frank Music Corp. v. CompuServe
Inc., No. 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 29, 1993) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Complaint, Frank
Music]:
"MIDI" is the acronym for "Musical Instrument Digital Interface." It constitutes
the stream of data that flows between musical units in the digital world of com-
puters and music-producing instruments such as synthesizers. It can be recorded
electronically in a computer's memory, stored permanently on the floppy discs
used in computers, and later recalled to play back the musical work which is the
subject of a MIDI recording.
33. A modem is a device that transmits computer data over telephone lines. How to Access
On Line Music, OTrAWA CITIZEN GAzattE, July 30, 1994, at D7.
34. A sound card may not be necessary if the user owns a Macintosh, which has built-in
sound capability. Id.
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Many computer users subscribe to commercial on-line services 35
that maintain on-line information and provide a means of electronic
communication for their customers. 36 These on-line services maintain
large mainframe computers containing various bulletin boards that
store literary, graphic and musical materials.37 CompuServe, for ex-
ample, features over 2000 services and activities available to its cus-
tomers, 5 to 10 percent of which involve downloading music. 38 If a
customer has the necessary hardware - a computer, modem, and
sound card - and any software necessary to decompress the stored,39
digitized music, one can download the sound files to one's com-
puter.40 Once there, the music can be transferred and stored on any
recordable medium, such as audiotape or a recordable CD.41
2. The Quality of Digitized Music
The digitizing process is significant in on-line dissemination due
to its potential for making high-quality copies of music. Once music
is transformed into digital code, that code can be reconstructed with
little or no loss of quality42 - this is not so for analog copying.
When an analog original is re-recorded, the quality is diminished.43 A
digitized song stored on a computer's hard disk will potentially sound
as good as a compact disc (CD) because both are digital formats."
35. Some well-known services include: CompuServe (with over 2.25 million users), Prod-
igy (with over 2 million users), and America Online (with over 1 million users). May Liang,
Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure, 415 PL/PAT 245 (Sept.
1995).
36. Frank Music Sues Compuserve in NY Over Music in Bulletin Board, ENr. Lrro. REp.,
Feb. 25, 1994.
37. Id.
38. Curry, supra note 2 (according to CompuServe's general counsel).
39. See infra part II.B.3 (discussing compression technology).
40. Marilyn A. Gillen, Cyberspies TrackI-Way Bootleggers, BILLBOARD, June 11, 1994, at
1 [hereinafter Gillen, Cyberspies].
41. Kristin Lieb, On-Line Archive Offers Music, BILLBOARD, Feb. 26, 1994, at 1 [hereinaf-
ter Lieb, On-Line Archive].
42. Jube Shiver, Jr., Digital Double Trouble; From Rap Music to Medical Formulas, Little
Seems Safe From Duplication. Ownership Rights Must Be Redefined When Images, Sound, Bits
of Data Can Be Copied - and Zapped Around the World, L.A. TIEs, Apr. 11, 1994, at Al.
A digital recorder transforms information - sounds, images or data - into an
electronic code that can be reconstructed by a digital playback machine with no
loss of quality. A bootlegged copy of a fifth-generation digital recording is virtu-
ally indistinguishable from the master tape stored in the vault at corporate
headquarters.
ld.
43. Id.
44. Nick Rosen, Internet Gives a Break to Budding Pop Stars, SuNDAY TIMES (LONDON),
Aug. 7, 1994, § 3, at 6 [hereinafter Rosen, Internet].
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However, digitized music takes up very large amounts of com-
puter memory space; even if the technology can produce high-quality
digitized music, those files can be quite cumbersome.45 In order to
move digitized music over the Internet, those sound files must be
compressed. Such compression may diminish the sound quality of the
digitized music. 46 Many in the music industry claim that this inferior-
quality music poses no immediate threat to the established music mar-
ket.47 The on-line music services, on the other hand, claim that com-
pression technology allows them to provide CD-quality music. 48
The quality of digitized music may vary, depending on the size of
the file and the amount of compression necessary to move the music
file over the Internet. However, the size of a digitized music file is not
the only potential problem in moving music on-line; time is also a
factor.
3. The Time It Takes to Disseminate Digitized Music
Using current technology, the delivery time for downloading dig-
itized music is somewhat slow. For example, a three minute song can
take 10-15 minutes to deliver.49 Downloading time and expense are
directly related to the size and complexity of the information in the
file. 0 At the present rates it may be impractical in terms of time and
computer storage space to download an entire CD.51 It could take
45. Glen Colboum, Technology Threatens the Record Store, CALGARY HERALD, July 29,
1994, at D3.
46. Lieb, On-line Archive, supra note 41 (comparing the impact of various compression
rates on storage space and loss of information) (One on-line music service "uses a compression
ratio of 10:1; by comparison, MD [MiniDise] is a 5:1 and DCC [Digital Compact Cassette] at
4:1. A higher compression ratio means more material can be stored in less space, but it can also
mean loss of part of the information.").
47. E.g., Colboum, supra note 45 (quoting Arthur Jelilyan, national marketing manager for
HMV stores) ('The amount of money you need and the technology to deliver digital sound
quality isn't there.'); Kristin Lieb, Online Music Realm Expands; More Acts Choosing 'Under-
ground'Avenue, BILoARD, Aug. 13, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Lieb, Online Music) (quoting Luke
Wood, director of marketing for Geffen Records) ('The sound quality isn't competitive"). But
cf Gillen, Cyberspies, supra note 40 (quoting Margo Langford, legal advisor to IFPI) ("Even if
the quality of digitized music on-line is not very good, [users] can download bootlegs and from
there, if you like what you hear, mail-order the products.").
48. See, e.g., Rosen, Internet, supra note 44 (claiming compression technique used by
Cerberus for on-line music distribution produces a clone of the CD without any loss of quality);
Dominic Sparkes, Cerberus Advances Online Audio; Service Says It Delivers CD Quality Fast,
BIULBOARD, Aug. 6, 1994, at 92 ("Cerberus claims compression/decompression technology en-
ables it to deliver CD-quality audio via computer.").
49. Dominic Pride, U.K Bands Attack Convention Thru Internet; Cerberus Allows Un-
signed Acts Exposure On System, BiLLaoARD, Aug. 6, 1994, at 3.
50. Sparkes, supra note 48 (according to Cerberus).
51. Strauss, supra note 15.
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years before technology is available to transfer information at speeds
fast enough to deliver an entire album to a personal computer.5
However, the development of better methods of compression and
storage are likely to reduce these transfer times drastically.53 Perhaps
more importantly, faster modems are becoming increasingly less ex-
pensive. In the very recent past, most modems transferred information
at 2,400 bits per second (bps). Today, the standard is 9,600-14,400
bps54 and appears to moving towards 28,000 bps. A file that would
have taken an hour to download at 2,400 bps can arrive in 10 minutes
or less at 14,400 bps.55
As with the quality of digitized music, the time it takes to
download such music is the subject of much disagreement. That tech-
nology will improve, on the other hand, seems undeniable.5 6 Quality
and time limitations, which once made the digital dissemination of
music over the Internet cumbersome and unworkable, will surely be
overcome through technological developments in the near future -
and perhaps they already have.57
C. The Technology of Digital Dissemination In Use
This section examines two independent on-line services that spe-
cialize in providing computer users with digitized music: The In-
dependent Underground Music Archive and the Cerberus Celestial
Jukebox. Although both of these services make only authorized use of
the music they disseminate, the methods they use, and the success they
have achieved, foreshadow the potential for copyright infringement on
the Internet. Their success also illustrates the potential positive as-
pects of digital dissemination if copyrighted works can be protected
on-line.
1. The Internet Underground Music Archive
In November 1993, two computer science majors at University of
California at Santa Cruz founded the Internet Underground Music
52. Landis, supra note 11.
53. Pride, supra note 49.
54. Landis, supra note 11.
55. Id.
56. Marilyn A. Gillen, Online Innovation Promises Instant Audio, BILLBOARD, April 15,
1995 (quoting Rob Glaser of Progressive Networks, a Seattle startup that introduced "Real Au-
dio" system, which allows audio to be heard by on-line service users in real time, i.e., simultane-
ously, in 1995) ("Audio is well below CD quality,... [and] initial uses [will] focus on 'voice-
driven content.").
57. See infra part II.C.
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Archive (IUMA).SS The two students took $20,000 in personal sav-
ings and set up the free, on-line digitized music dissemination system,
which allows unknown bands to have their music heard around the
world via the Intemet.5 9 In addition to placing digitized demo tapes of
the bands on-line,60 the IUMA allows the artists to place graphics and
text on the Internet.6 1 The system also provides access to statistics
showing how many times a band's material has been downloaded. 61
The IUMA, which allows computer users to access the music on-line
free-of-charge, relies on donations from the participating bands to
keep the service going.63
The service gained national attention as the media and the estab-
lished music industry attempted to understand the new technology,
and in June of 1994, Geffen Records became the first major label to
enter the picture when it placed a 30-second clip of one of the label's
alternative bands online.64 Significantly, Geffen agreed to the stan-
dard IUMA agreement, which required the label to waive all royalties
on the dissemination of its digitized work.65
The number of artists with music on IUMA went from only 16 in
February of 1994 to more than 140 by August of that year. 6 The
IUMA now boasts artists from all over the world, including Japan,
Australia, and Canada.67 On any given day, more than 100,000 people
use the system to access digitized music, 68 and the actual number of
accesses may be as high as 250,000.69 It appears possible that IUMA
can become a full-fledged alternative distribution system, offering en-
tire albums at minimal cost to users.70 This fact has not gone unno-
ticed by the multinational recording companies that dominate the
58. Lieb, Online Music, supra note 47.
59. Tam, supra note 11.
60. Lieb, Online Music, supra note 47.
61. Lieb, On-Line Archive, supra note 41.
62. Lieb, Online Music, supra note 47.
63. Id.
64. Id.; Kristin Lieb, Underground Music Archive Comes of Age, BILLBOAM, June 10,
1995 [hereinafter Lieb, Comes of Age] ("Geffen ... has since developed its own Internet site,
which is linked to IJMA.").
65. Lieb, Online Music, supra note 47.
66. Id. Cf Lieb, Comes ofAge, supra note 64 ("IUMA [by June 1995 had] the songs and
press kits of more than 600 signed and unsigned bands online.").
67. Tan, supra note 11 (In August of 1994, IUMA boasted "more than 150 Indie bands,
i.e., those not signed to a major record company, on its menu, ranging from Japan's Platinum
Kiss Kiss, to Australia's Non Bossy Possee, to Pinawa, Manitoba's Vent Potato.07 or Toronto's
Hot D.A.M.").
68. Want 30 Million Fans? (Advertisement), P.A.I.N. INDnaPENDENr Music, March - May,
1995.
69. Lieb, Comes of Age, supra note 64.
70. Lieb, On-Line Archive, supra note 41.
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recording industry.71 Further, the IUMA concept has been copied by
hundreds of other so-called "digital jukeboxes" worldwide.72 Un-
doubtedly, many of those other services do not get permission from
the copyright holders for much of the digitized music their users are
placing onto, and downloading from, their bulletin boards. In attempt-
ing to avoid the established music industry, the IUMA may have ex-
posed a "minefield of legal questions that are just now coming to the
fore in the copyright community. 7 3
In July 1994 the IUMA released the first complete on-line album
in what the service calls "a high-fidelity format."'74 The sixteen-song
album includes fifty-three minutes of music; lyrics, album art, and
liner notes are available in accompanying graphics files. 75 The time it
takes to download the entire album is approximately seven to eight
hours.76 The IUMA has clearly taken the "lawless Internet" attitude to
heart, offering free digitized music to anyone who has the equipment
to access it. Their success also illustrate the reality that this is not
simply a future technology - dissemination of digitized music is hap-
pening now.
2. The Cerberus Celestial Jukebox
In September 1994 a small London-based company called Cerbe-
rus launched its own on-line music delivery service, known as the
"Digital Jukebox."'7 7 Although this comment is focused on issues aris-
ing under United States Copyright law, this part is dedicated to this
British company. Cerberus' advanced compression technology and
downloading payment system distinguish this system from the IUMA
and provide positive examples of systems that might be implemented
in the United States.
With 1,200 songs from about 600 artists in the main database,
Cerberus, like the IUMA, provides a working model for digital deliv-
ery, which had previously been limited to theoretical systems.78 Per-
haps the most intriguing aspect of the Cerberus service is its newly-
developed music compression technology. Cerberus describes its
method as follows:
71. Rawsthom, supra note 12.
72. Id.
73. Lieb, On-Line Archive, supra note 41.
74. Lieb, Online Music, supra note 47.
75. Id.
76. Id. See also supra part II.B.3.
77. Rosen, Internet, supra note 44.
78. Pride, supra note 49.
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Material is fed into an ordinary PC at Cerberus and compressed in
real time. To compensate for any loss of quality in the compression
process, the system compares the original recording with the same
track after it has gone through compression and decompression.
The Cerberus software then overemphasizes certain frequencies
that have been damaged in the decompression process, and adds
them to the original. It then re-compresses the track. The added
equalization allows the quality of the compressed clone to be al-
most identical to the original.79
The Cerberus software, which has been freely given away by the
company,80 has the ability to shrink a 4-minute song to one tenth of its
original size."1 A single song takes approximately 12 minutes to
download from the Cerberus system. 2 According to Cerberus, this
system can deliver sound quality equal to that of a CD. s3
The Cerberus system is also noteworthy for its methods of col-
lecting payment for digitized music. If copyright owners are to be
compensated when their works are disseminated on-line, methods of
tracking the works and receiving payment must be developed. The
Cerberus Digital Jukebox offers one model. Using this system, cus-
tomers pay using a credit card, and then they are issued a password
that allows them to select the music they want. 4
The Cerberus system has won the cooperation of the Mechanical
Copyright Protection Society (MCPS), s5 which collects royalties each
time a record by one of the society's members is played in public.8 6
The MCPS has licensed Cerberus to collect money for its members.87
These royalties are collected by Cerberus at a minimum rate of 10
percent of its members' downloading costs.
8 8
79. Sparkes, supra note 48.
80. Pride, supra note 49.
81. Rosen, Internet, supra note 44.
82. Sparkes, supra note 48 ("Cerberus can offer a five-minute song in 12 minutes, whereas
others - for example, the recent Aerosmith experiment - took 90 minutes to download.").
The "Aerosmith experimene' refers to the much-publicized release of the Aerosmith song Head
First on-line. The track was the first major-label, on-line-only release, available on the Internet
for a limited time, never to be released again. Thousands downloaded the track free-of-charge
and royalty free, and reports of massive downloading times abounded. Head First was later
released as the B-side of the Blind Man single, from the Big Ones album. AEROSMrri, Head
First, on BLIm MAN B/w HEAD FiRsr (Geffen Records Inc. 1994).
83. Sparkes, supra note 48.
84. Rosen, Royalties Boost, supra note 12.
85. Id. (comparing MCPS' collection of performance royalties on behalf of its members
with U.S. counterparts, [the American Society of Composers, Artists, and Producers (ASCAP)
and Broadcast Music Incorporated (BMI)]).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. MCPS Fixes Royalty for Digital Services, Music WK, Nov. 26, 1994, at 4.
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The licensing of Cerberus by the MCPS raises several questions
that have close analogies to the questions that arise under United
States copyright law: Is downloading in fact a "performance"? Is the
royalty collected by Cerberus a royalty for the performance of the
song? For making a "copy" of the song? For making a copy of the
recording? Or, is the 10% royalty intended to include all three?
These questions are integral to determining the applicability of United
States copyright law to the dissemination of digitized music on the
Internet. The LUMA has avoided these questions by simply not charg-
ing its users to download music. However, if the Internet is to become
a viable medium for safe (from a copyright standpoint) dissemination
of digitized music, these questions must be answered.
III. PROTECTION UNDER CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW
The ability of copyright owners to protect their copyrighted
works8 9 depends, barring new legislation,90 on the protection offered
under the 1976 Copyright Act.91 The new technological advances in-
volved in the dissemination of digitized music over the Internet have
led many to believe that the current copyright law requires modifica-
tion in order to keep copyright viable on the Information Superhigh-
way.92 The extent to which a download can be analogized to one or
89. Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression .... Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
90. Proposed and pending new legislation is discussed in section IV, infra.
91. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1101 (1977 & Supp. 1995).
92. Copyright laws already make clear that music, writing, software and other
forms of creative expression can be legally protected, giving the owner an exclu-
sive permit to reproduce and distribute the work. But when material such as
books and recordings are posted on on-line services such as Prodigy or Com-
puServe - where any computer user can gain access - the law is murky.
Jeff Leeds, Cyberspace Copyright Proposal Draws Praise; Technology: The Administration's
Draft Would Extend Protection to On-Line Services and Digital Broadcasting, L.A. TiMES, July
8, 1994, at Dl. But cf. Terry, supra note 4 (explaining that music publishers and rights societies
contend that existing copyright law is equal to the task of licensing not only computer services,
but also interactive multimedia and virtual-reality games); Colbourn, supra note 45 (quoting
Kevin Schlueter, a University of Toronto Ph.D. candidate researching digital audio and video)
("The biggest obstacle [to widespread dissemination of digitized music] will be getting this by
the copyright holders.").
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more of those activities within the exclusive rights of copyright may
be the determining factor as to whether current law offers adequate
protection in cyberspace.
A. The Exclusive Rights Under the 1976 Copyright Adt
Although the Copyright Act gives copyright owners control of
nearly all activities of commercial value that can be made of their
works,93 the use of those works is not copyright infringement unless it
conflicts with the statutorily recognized exclusive rights.94 Among
the exclusive rights copyright law grants are the rights to reproduce,
distribute, and perform the work.95 One who violates any of the ex-
clusive rights, by trespassing into the copyright owners exclusive do-
main to reproduce, distribute, and perform the work, is an infringer of
the copyright. 9
6
Perhaps the most fundamental97 right granted by the Copyright
Act is the exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted work. Section
106(1) of the Copyright Act grants the exclusive right "to reproduce
the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords." g Copies are "mate-
rial objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the work can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly
or with the aid of a machine or device."9 9 Phonorecords are "material
objects in which sounds... are fixed by any method now known or
later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
93. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F.Supp. 1552, 1555 (M.D. Fla. 1993);
Subject to sections 106 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(I) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies of phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the pub-
lic by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly ....
17 U.S.C. § 106. It is important to note that the exclusive right of performance outlined in (4)
above does not apply to sound recordings.
94. Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F.Supp. 672, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (cit-
ing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975)).
95. Leeds, supra note 92; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "perform").
96. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,433 (1984) (citing 17 U.S.C.
§ 501(a) for the definition of "infringer.").
97. NIl REPoRT, supra note 1, at 42. See infra part IV.A (discussing NII Task Force).
98. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
99. Id. § 101 (defining "copies").
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machine or device."' 00 The exact wording of this statutory language,
along with judicial interpretation of these sections, will prove ex-
tremely important in determining what rights are implicated by the
dissemination of digitized music on the Internet. The copyright owner
also holds the exclusive right "to distribute copies or phonorecords of
the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of owner-
ship, or by rental, lease, or lending."'' 1
The exclusive right to distribute a work must be contrasted with
"transmission" of a work, to which there is no exclusive right. To
transmit a work is to "communicate it by any device or process
whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which
they are sent."'" 2
Finally, the third exclusive right implicated by digital dissemina-
tion is the right to perform a copyrighted work.'03 The copyright
owner has the exclusive right "in the case of literary, musical.., and
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copy-
righted work publicly."" 4 To perform a work publicly means:
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any
place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal
circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to
transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the
work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of
any device or process, whether the members of the public capable
of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place
or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.10 5
It is important to note that the right to perform covers literary,
musical and audiovisual works. However, it does not include sound
recordings: there is no exclusive right of performance in a sound re-
cording. 106 This means that if downloading is the type *of "transmis-
sion" specified in the definition of "performance" above, downloading
is a performance. If characterized exclusively as a performance,
downloading will not infringe the exclusive rights held by the copy-
right holder of a sound recording. Therefore, for the owners of sound
100. Id.
101. Id. § 106(3).
102. Id. § 101.
103. Although this comment does not deal with the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works (Id. § 106(2)), the ease with which digital information can be altered is clearly an impor-
tant collateral issue surrounding the digital transfer of music via the Interet.
104. Id. § 106(4).
105. Id. § 101.
106. See infra part IV.B (discussing a proposal to amend the Copyright Act to establish
such an exclusive right, at least with respect to "digital performance" of sound recordings).
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recordings, defining a download is clearly an important issue in the
context of digital dissemination.
B. Defining a Download
1. Is Digital Dissemination a Reproduction? 10 7
The mere appearance of a copyrighted work on a computer
screen does not necessarily implicate the exclusive right of
reproduction.
[T]he reproduction right is not infringed even if the defendant em-
bodies the plaintiff's work in a material object,.unless such embod-
iment is of more than transitory duration. In order to constitute an
infringing copy or phonorecord, the embodiment of the plaintiff's
work must be not only tangible (a 'material object'); it must also be
of some permanence.' 08
There are several instances within a digital dissemination that are
clearly more than transitory images upon a screen and may be charac-
terized as a reproduction. A copy of a work is made when: a work is
placed into a computer, whether on a floppy disk or into the com-
puter's own memory; when a work is transferred to digital form and
placed into a file (a MIDI file in the case of music); when a digitized
file is uploaded from a user's computer to a bulletin board (BBS);
when a digitized file is downloaded from a BBS or other server; and
when a file is transferred from one computer user to another.10 9
In the case of Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPHL4," 0 the court
upheld a preliminary injunction against a bulletin board operator,
MAPHIA, who allowed and encouraged its customers to exchange un-
authorized copies of plaintiff's computer games on the bulletin board.
107. There has been some debate over how to categorize digitized works - for
example, CD-ROM versions of photographs, movies, or music. Are they copies
of the original, or, because digitized works can be easily altered, are they
adaptations? When something is pulled up on a computer screen, is that a display
or a performance?
Leeds, supra note 92. See generally Shiver, supra note 42 (quoting John Perry Barlow, a song-
writer for the Grateful Dead and co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a Washington
group that lobbies on cyberspace issues) ("Information is becoming liquid. It can no longer be
contained.').
108. MELVILLE B. NinaMttR & DAVID Nn&mEt, 2 NIMMER ON Copymuorr § 8.02[B][2]
(1994) [hereinafter NmlmER].
109. NIl REPoRT, supra note 1, at 43 (discussing the cases of textual or visual works where
a copy is also made when a user browses a document that resides on another computer) ("[T]he
image on the user's screen exists ... only by virtue of the copy that has been reproduced in the
user's computer memory.").
110. 857 F.Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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The court, in that case, characterized the uploading and downloading
as constituting the making of copies:
[C]opies of its games are made when such games are uploaded to
the MAPHIA bulletin board, here with the knowledge of Defendant
Scherman .... [U]nauthorized copies of these games are also made
when they are downloaded to make additional copies by users,
which copying is facilitated and encouraged by the MAPHIA bulle-
tin board.11'
Thus, in the case of the unauthorized dissemination of computer
games, at least one case has found downloading analogous to
reproducing.
There are very few cases involving this rather novel issue of un-
authorized digital dissemination of copyrighted works, but at least one
has chosen not to rest its finding of infringement on the exclusive right
of reproduction. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc., v. Frena1 2 the unau-
thorized downloading of a copyrighted photo was held to infringe
plaintiff's exclusive right of distribution;" 3 the court made no finding
concerning the exclusive right of reproduction." 4
No precedent yet exists for defining a download in the context of
the dissemination of digitized music over the Internet. However, as
illustrated in Sega, when a computer game is downloaded a copy is
made. Similarly, the Playboy court did not rule out that when a photo-
graph is downloaded it is reproduced, though that decision rests on
other grounds. In a case now pending, Frank Music Corp. v. Com-
puServe, Inc., 5 the plaintiff's complaint characterizes the digitized
transfer of their copyrighted songs as "copies or phonorecords" of the
songs, clearly implicating the exclusive right of reproduction.' 16 It
remains to be seen if the digital dissemination of music will be held to
implicate the reproduction right of the Copyright Act. Nevertheless,
this comment maintains that the exclusive right of reproduction is
clearly violated by the unauthorized dissemination of digitized music
over the Internet.
S111. Id. at 686.
112. 839 F.Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
113. Operator of Computer Bulletin BoardLiable for Infringement, 6 No. 2 . PROPRIETARY
RTS. 25 (1994) [hereinafter PROPRiETARY RiGrrs].
114. See infra part III.B.2 (discussing the exclusive right of distribution and expanding on
Playboy).
115. No. 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 29, 1993). See infra part V.B (concerning third
party liability for copyright infringement as discussed in Frank Music).
116. See infra discussion part V.B (concerning liability for copyright infringement as dis-
cussed in Frank Music).
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2. Is Digital Dissemination a Distribution?
Distribution of a copyrighted work is a right reserved to the copy-
right owner, and unauthorized distribution constitutes infringement.'
1 7
When a record or CD is made available to the public through a retail
outlet, the music contained therein has been distributed. However,
current law does not clarify whether transmitting information electron-
ically constitutes distributing it.""8
In Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Frena, 9 the court held a BBS
operator liable for allowing users to upload and download copyrighted
photographic images. The court appeared uncertain as to whether
these transactions constituted a reproduction 2 ° and instead focused on
the distribution aspect:
Public distribution of a copyrighted work is a right reserved to the
copyright owner, and usurpation of that right constitutes infringe-
ment.... [Playboy Enterprise's] right... to distribute copies to the
public has been implicated by Defendant Frena [the bulletin board
service operator]. Section 106(3) grants the copyright owner "the
exclusive right to sell, give away, rent or lend any material embodi-
ment of his work." . . . It does not matter that Defendant Frena
claims it did not make the copies itself.'21
Part of the confusion stems from the nature of a digital transac-
tion, in which, after selling or giving the copy to another party, the
original owner of the copy still possesses a copy.' 22 This is unlike a
conventional transaction which dispossesses the seller of his or her
copy. This "dispossessing" aspect of a conventional transaction is ex-
tremely important in light of the so-called "first sale doctrine." 12 3 The
first sale doctrine, encompassed in section 109(a) of the Copyright
Act, limits the exclusive right of distribution by allowing the owner of
a "particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title... to
sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or pho-
norecord."' 24 In other words, once a customer has purchased a CD, he
or she is free to turn around and sell that CD to another - to re-
distribute that copy. However, it is uncertain whether he or she may
117. Playboy, 839 F.Supp. at 1552.
118. Scott Donaton & David J. Wallace, Caught in the Rights Maze Lack of Rules Leaves
Publishers Wondering Who Owns the Content, ADVERTsiNG AGE, July 25, 1994, at 23.
119. 839 F.Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
120. Nil REPORT, supra note 1, at 44-45.
121. Playboy, 839 F.Supp. at 1556, cited in NII REPORT, supra note 1, at 44-45. See also
infra part V.B (discussing third party copyright infringement liability for BBS operators).
122. NII REPORT, supra note 1, at 59-60.
123. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
124. Id.
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take a lawfully obtained CD and upload it onto a bulletin board for
others to download.
Certainly a digital dissemination is a transaction through which
the computer user, by downloading the file, has obtained a copy of the
work."z' If that event is characterized as a distribution, as opposed to
a reproduction, the user may be entitled under the first sale doctrine to
re-distribute the work without the copyright owner's permission:
126
If... one characterizes as a "distribution" the transaction that be-
gins with a digitized copy in a BBS, and concludes with a digitized
copy in the BBS's computer and a digitized copy in the user's com-
puter, then the user would appear privileged to make a similar
transfer to another user under the umbrella of the first sale
doctrine.12 7
In the Playboy case, it seems clear that a BBS subscriber, at the
end of a transaction, possessed a copy of a Playboy photograph. How-
ever, it is unclear whether it was illegally distributed by the BBS.' 28
Characterizing a digital dissemination as a distribution would appear
to create a loophole in the copyright law - the first sale doctrine -
through which unauthorized uploading and downloading could be car-
ried on without fear of liability. 12
9
3. Is Digital Dissemination a Performance?
a. The Perormance of a Musical Work
The Copyright Act states that to "perform" a work is to "recite,
render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device
or process .... ,,130 The performance right in music is the exclusive
125. See supra part III.B.1.
126. WoasING GROUP ON INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY RIoHTS OF THE WHrrE HousE INFoR-
MATION INFRAsTRuCTuRE TASK FORCE, 94TH CONG., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRAsrRUcruRE, at 39.
127. Id. at 39, n. 112. But see NII Report, supra note 1, at 61 ("It seems clear that the first
sale model - in which the copyright owner parts company with a tangible copy - should not
apply with respect to distribution by transmission, because transmission by means of current
technology involves both the reproduction of the work and the distribution of that
reproduction.").
128. NII REPORT, supra note 1, at 45. See also infra part V.B (discussing of third party
liability for copyright infringement).
129. See infra part IV.A (discussing the Infrastructure Task Force's recommended changes
to the first sale doctrine).
130. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
[A] singer is performing when he or she sings a song; a broadcaster is performing
when it transmits his or her performance (whether simultaneously or from
records); a local broadcaster is performing when it transmits the network broad-
cast; a cable television system is performing when it retransmits the broadcast to
its subscribers; and any individual is performing when he or she plays a record
[Vol. 12
DIGITIZED MUSIC
right to perform the music publicly. This does not necessarily require
a large public concert. A performance is "public" if it takes place
somewhere that is open to the public - even if only a few people are
in attendance at the time. Further, the audience need not all receive
the performance at the same time.13 Therefore, the fact that a file
containing digitized music is downloaded by different users at differ-
ent times will not preclude a finding that a performance is taking
place. Also, a computer is a device through which such a rendering
can take place. A public performance does not require a live perform-
ance; playing a record, or other device, in public qualifies as a public
performance.1 32 Electronic retrieval systems and computers are de-
vices through which a performance may take place.
Creative methods of performing copyrighted works have consist-
ently been found violative of the public performance rights of the
copyright owner.1 33 In Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Home,
Inc.134 the court held that infringement of the public performance right
occurred where a video store operator provided semi-private screening
rooms where rented tapes could be viewed. The fact that the render-
ing of the work was only perceivable by a single customer did not
preclude a finding that a public performance had occurred. In a very
similar case, Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Aveco, Inc.,135 public per-
formance liability was again found where video rental customers
rented rooms for private viewing. Any member of the public could
use these rooms and, although the performances took place at different
times, the court found that the performance right had been infringed.
Also, in On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,1 36 a
public performance was found where hotel guests selected video tapes
to be played in their rooms via a signal sent from a remote control
console in the hotel basement. The fact that in these cases no copy of
the work itself has transferred to the customer does not preclude a
finding that a performance has occurred. 137
However, the transfer of data - a MDI music file for example
- does not necessarily result in the "rendering" of the musical work
album embodying the performance or communicates the performance by turning
on a radio.
KomrN, supra note 25, at 628 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1976)).
131. KoHN, supra note 25, at 628. See also 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(4).
132. NimmER, supra note 108, § 8.14[B].
133. NIl REPorT, supra note 1, at 46.
134. 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984).
135. 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986).
136. 777 F.Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
137. NiaMER, supra note 108, § 8.02[A] ("[Tihe performance per se does not result in the
reproduction of the plaintiff's work in material objects.").
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it contains. 138  Certainly the inputting alone of a digitized musical
work would not constitute a rendering, or performance, of the musical
work.'39 It would seem that the downloading of the same work is
likewise not a performance. At neither stage is the musical work per-
ceived by the user. In order for liability to attach for violation of the
exclusive right to perform a copyrighted work, a public performance
must occur.140  Does a public performance occur if the music con-
tained in a MIDI file is not rendered in any perceivable form until it is
played back by the user in the privacy of his or her own home?
Conceivably, a musical work embodied in a MIDI file could be
uploaded onto a bulletin board, and subsequently downloaded onto a
user's computer, without ever rendering the work. This transmission
without rendering would not itself be a performance. 141 However, this
ignores reality. The purpose for uploading and downloading music
fies is to perform them, either through playback on the user's com-
puter, or after transferring the work to some other medium, such as
audio tape. This comment asserts that an unauthorized dissemination
of a digitized musical work via the Internet may be properly consid-
ered a public performance of that work in violation of the owner's
copyright' 42
b. The Special Problem for Sound Recordings 43
Determining whether a downloaded recording has been dupli-
cated, performed, distributed, or some combination of the three, is ex-
138. NII REPoRT, supra note 1, at 46 ("When a copy of a work is transmitted over wires...
in digital form so that it may be captured in a user's computer, without being 'rendered'... it
has rather clearly not been performed.").
139. NIMMER, supra note 108, § 8.14[B].
140. [I]n order to maintain... [a] claim ... [plaintiffs] must establish the following
elements with respect to the compositions in suit: (1) originality and authorship;
(2) compliance with the formalities of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914;
(3) Plaintiff's ownership of the copyrights involved; (4) public performance of
the compositions; and (5) lack of authorization.
Pedrosillo Music, Inc. v. Radio Musical, Inc., 815 F.Supp. 511, 514 (D.P.R. 1993) (emphasis
added).
141. NII REPoRT, supra note 1, at 46.
142. Traiman, supra note 18 (explaining that Broadcast Music Inc. (BMI) became the first
performance rights society to grant an Internet music license in April of 1995). See also Marilyn
A. Gillen & Irv Lichtman, Precedent Set with Grant ofBlanket Online License by BMI, BILL-
hOARD, April 15, 1995 [hereinafter Gillen, Precedent Set] (quoting Frances Preston, BMI Presi-
dent and CEO) ("[B.M.I.] ... recognizes that the online transmission of musical compositions
constitutes a public performance under the U.S. Copyright Law.").
143. This comment does not deal with the possibility that transcriptions of a musical work,
or "sheet music," might be the subject of unauthorized dissemination over the Internet. Such a
case would not involve a sound recording. However, the On Line Guitar Archive (OLGA) is just
such a service. OLGA's users upload their own guitar tablature (chorded fingering chart)
versions of songs. OLGA contains thousands of songs in tablature form, which users may freely
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tremely important in defining the protection provided to owners of
sound recording copyrights under current law.1" Distinguishing a
performance from a distribution is much more difficult in the case of
downloaded music than when the sound recording is embodied in a
compact disc, cassette, or vinyl record.145 Owners of copyrights in
sound recordings, unlike the owners of copyright in the underlying
musical compositions, do not have an exclusive right of perform-
ance. 46 If the rendering of a recording through the use of a computer
and a modem is indeed a performance, as opposed to a duplication, the
rights of sound recording copyright owners may be valueless in
cyberspace.1 47
Of course, in the case of a digital dissemination of a musical
work, it is necessary that the musical work itself be embodied in a
sound recording.148 But the sound recording and the underlying musi-
cal composition are two distinct entities in copyright law:
A sound recording as copyrightable subject matter must be distin-
guished from the copyrighted literary, musical or dramatic work
embodied in the sound recording and fixed on a phonorecord.
When a copyrighted song is recorded on a phonorecord, there are
two separate copyrights: one on the musical composition and the
other in the sound recording .... Thus the rights of an owner of a
copyright in a sound recording do not extend to the song itself. A
download. Such a service clearly displaces sales of sheet music in the form of guitar tablature.
OLGA's operators claim that the service is within the fair use exception to copyright exclusivity
because they do not charge and the tablatures are for educational purposes. This seems to ignore
the infringement of the exclusive right to make a derivative work, which occurs each time a user
transposes a song and uploads it onto the service. Also, it is unlikely that the fair use exception
encompasses the wholesale duplication and distribution of entire catalogs of music and lyrics to
anyone on the Internet.
144. [I]nteractive digital audio technology threatens to blur the line between the per-
formance and the distribution of sound recordings. Labeling the service provided
by an interactive digital audio system a "performance" would permit the free use
of the sound recordings by interactive digital audio systems and deny owners of
the sound recording copyright any remuneration for what would essentially be a
distribution of their copyrighted sound recordings.
Calamita, supra note 8, at 522 (footnotes omitted).
145. Id. at 544 (pointing out that the line between performance of the copyrighted sound
recording and distribution of phonorecords has been blurred).
146. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) ("The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound record-
ing are limited to the rijhts specified by clauses (1), (2), and (3) of[17 U.S.C. § 106], and do not
include any right of performance under section 106(4).").
147. Calamita, supra note 8, at 547 (suggesting that, to cure this problem for sound record-
ings, commercial interactive transmission of copyrighted sound recordings be included within
the definition of "rental" as used in the Record Rental Amendment of 1984, 17 U.S.C.
§ 109(b)(l)(A), which bans the unauthorized rental of sound recordings).
148. Terry, supra note 4 (quoting Edward Murphy, president of the Harry Fox Agency)
("Compuserve files representing musical renditions are sound recordings, just like a CD or an
audiotape.").
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copyright in the recording and in the song are separate and distinct
and by statute are treated differently.149
Thus it is possible, and may be the usual situation, that the owner
of the copyright in a sound recording is not the same person or entity
that owns the copyright in the musical work.150 For example, an artist
may compose a song to which he or she will own the copyright.1
5 1
When that song is recorded, either by the artist who wrote it or by
another artist, a second copyright arises - the copyright in the spe-
cific sound recording. The sound recording copyright will most likely
be held by the record company that employs the recording artist, or
whoever produced, financed, and otherwise controlled the recording
session. 152
The copyright owner of a sound recording will not receive royal-
ties for performance or broadcast of the sound recording because the
1976 Copyright Act simply does not provide an exclusive right of per-
formance in sound recordings.' 53 Therefore, if a digital dissemination
of music is characterized as a performance, while it is not found to be
either a reproduction or a distribution, then no infringement of the
exclusive rights in a sound recording copyright will occur through un-
authorized downloading of sound recordings.
The owners of sound recording copyrights will nonetheless be
protected given the strong analogies of a download to both a reproduc-
tion and a distribution - both of which are exclusive rights protected
under the Copyright Act. However, many believe that the novel na-
ture of digital dissemination, the possibly problematic nuances created
by the first sale doctrine and the lack of a sound recording perform-
ance right require changes in the current copyright law.
149. T.B. Harms Co. v. JEM Records, Inc., 655 F.Supp. 1575, 1577 n.1 (D.N.J. 1987)
(citations omitted).
150. Id.
151. Sometimes the artist will have transferred all or part of their copyright to a publisher.
152. This is not a clearly defined area. For a discussion of who acquires copyright in a
sound recording, absent a clear writing, see Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604 (1st Cir. 1993)
(where plaintiff did not acquire copyright to recordings although he had'arranged and financed
the recording sessions).
153. StaE" SHEMEL & M. WuLiM KIRs1Lovs'KY, THis BusiNss OF Music 41 (6th ed.
1990). Shemel and Krasilovsky note that "[a] report has been submitted in which the Register of
Copyrights recommends that the Copyright Act be amended to provide performance rights, sub-
ject to compulsory licensing, in sound recordings and that the benefits, in the form of royalties,
be extended to performers and record producers.... At this writing the report has not been
implemented by statute." See infra part IV.B (discussing a proposed amendment to the Copy-
right Act that would create a digital performance right in sound recordings).
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IV. PROPOSED CHANGES TO CURRENT COPYRIGHT LAW
Despite the protection offered by the exclusive rights granted
under current copyright law,154 changes have been proposed to ad-
dress the perceived dilemma digital technology creates for copyright
owners.' 55 The prevailing view appears to be that current law needs
updating to deal with new technologies that were not imaginable when
the law was created.156 It has been argued that "[tlhe reason this na-
tion's copyright laws appeared to work so well for so long was be-
cause it was physically hard to make a book or a record; you had to
have the physical product to pass it around." '157 The new technologies
involved in digital dissemination are indeed developing faster than
new laws can be enacted,15 and many copyright owners are "in a race
to try and get the laws current with technology." '159
A. The Information Infrastructure Task Force
Recommendations
On September 15, 1993, President Clinton established the United
States Advisory Council on the National Information Infrastructure
(NII) by executive order.160 Among the issues addressed by the Coun-
sel were privacy, security, and copyright issues of a National Informa-
tion Infrastructure - meaning the Internet and other forms of
electronic communication. 16 ' Part of the NIL agenda is to "investigate
how to strengthen domestic copyright laws and international intellec-
tual property treaties to prevent piracy and to protect the integrity of
intellectual property." '162
President Clinton appointed U.S. Patent and Trademark Commis-
sioner Bruce H. Lehman to serve as chairman of the NII Task
154. See supra part III.
155. Cf. Calamita, supra note 8, at 531 ("Digital audio technology offers no new threats to
the current balance of the copyright law that cannot be satisfactorily resolved by reference to the
existing rights of sound recording copyright owners." (citation omitted)).
156. Junda Woo, Government Paper on Copyrights In Cyberspace Vexes Some Finns,
WALL ST. J., Sep. 2, 1994, at B3.
157. Shiver, supra note 42.
158. Leeds, supra note 92 (citing the Recording Industry Association of America, which
represents Sony, PolyGram, MCA and other companies) (extending current copyright laws in
cyberspace will prevent digital broadcast firms from offering performances over cable television
wires without compensating the artist).
159. Landis, supra note 11.
160. Exec. Order No 12864, 3 C.F.R. § 634 (1994).
161. Id.
162. INFORMATION INFRAsmucruRE TASK FORCE, THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRA-
sTRucrun: AGENDA FOR ACTiON (1993), reprinted in THE INFORMATION INFRAsucrtuRE
SoURcEnOOK 11 (Harvard University JFK School of Government) (1993).
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Force. 6 3 Lehman has expressed concern that digital technology "is
raising important legal questions ... and posing a real challenge to
anyone seeking to maintain the copyright integrity of their work."'164
In July of 1994 the NII Task Force produced a preliminary re-
port for updating the law on intellectual property, titled the "Green
Paper." A final NII report followed in the Fall of 1995, the "White
Paper," referred to here simply as the NIH Report. The NII Report, as
did the Green Paper, focuses mostly on the rights of copyright owners
and proposes that minor tinkering with current law is needed to mod-
ernize it. 165 The NII Report recommends a series of refinements in
the copyright laws that will clarify the scope of copyright protection
for digitized works and make it easier to prosecute offenders., 66
The NII Report's first proposed change in copyright law would
explicitly designate "transmission" as a form of distribution encom-
passed by the exclusive right of distribution in § 106(3).167 The NI
Report also recommends that the definition of "transmit" be amended
to recognize that a transmission may contain a reproduction of the
work, and not merely a performance or display.168  These above
amendments would indeed clarify the nature of a download, making it
clear that a digital dissemination that results in a copy of the work
being placed onto a computer user's memory storage device is a distri-
bution of a copy. This would close any loophole in the current law
based on the lack of an exclusive right to transmit a work.
The NI Report's predecessor, the Green Paper, also sought to
close the loophole created by the first sale doctrine in a situation
where a digital dissemination is characterized as a distribution. Recall
that if a digital transfer is characterized as a distribution, § 109(a) of
the Copyright Act allows the free re-distribution of the specific copy
that was distributed. When a digital copy is transferred, however, the
original copy remains with the transferee - there is no "disposses-
163. Shiver, supra note 42.
164. Id.
165. Woo, supra note 156.
166. Sugawara, supra note 7.
167. The proposed changes are: "to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending, or by
transmission." Nil REPoRT, supra note 1, at 136-38 and Appendix 2 (Underlined text indicates a
proposed addition, while strikeout indicates a deletion.).
168. Id. at 139 & App. 2. The following amendment to the § 101 definition of"transmit" is
urged:
To "transmit" a performance or display is to communicate it by any device or
process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they
are sent. To "transmit" a reproduction is to distribute it by any device or process
whereby a copy or phonorecord of the work is fixed beyond the place from which
it was sent.
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sion." The Green Paper proposed to limit the first sale doctrine by
specifically excluding sales, or other transfers, that occurred by trans-
mission. However, the NIL Report has taken the position that digital
transmissions do not fit into the first sale doctrine as it exists now.169
The Green Paper's proposals, which are generally consistent with
the NII Report, have been criticized as leaving on-line services and
bulletin boards open to too much liability for copyright infringe-
ment.17 0 Some believe this will cause them to raise prices, which is
inconsistent with the NIL purpose - widespread access at a reason-
able cost.1 71 However, the Task Force concluded that courts and mar-
ket forces were dealing adequately with these violations, and that no
further intervention was necessary. 172
B. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording
The "special problem for sound recordings" 173 has been taken up
by some members of Congress in the form of the Digital Performance
Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995.174 The Act has passed the
Senate 1 75 and the House of Representatives and is likely to be signed
into law by President Clinton.1 76 The Act will have little impact on
traditional analog broadcasting, or public performance of recordings in
places like bars and restaurants. However, digital public perform-
ances of sound recordings will, under the Act, be subject to an exclu-
sive right in favor of the copyright holder. The Act categorizes such
digital performances in three ways: subscription transmissions,1 77 non-
subscription transmissions, 7 ' and transmissions by interactive serv-
ices.179 The problem of unauthorized digital dissemination of a sound
recording, as discussed in this comment, fits into the "interactive ser-
vice" category.
The Act would require on-line services to secure a license, either
from the copyright holder or a performance rights society licensed by
the same, before rendering a public performance of a sound record-
169. NII REPoRT, supra note 1, at 61.
170. See generally May Liang, Intellectual Property and the National Information Infra-
structure, 415 PLI/PAT 245 (Sept. 1995).
171. Woo, supra note 156.
172. Id.
173. See supra part II.B.3.b (discussing the absence of an exclusive right of performance in
a copyrighted sound recording under current copyright law).
174. S. 227, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
175. Bill Holland, Per. Rights Bill on Way to White House, BILLBOARD, Oct. 28, 1995, at 6.
176. Id.
177. S. 227, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. § 3(3) (1995).
178. Id.
179. Id.
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ing.' 8 ° Further, the Copyright Act would be amended to include an
exclusive right, "in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copy-
righted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission."'181
This has the effect of giving the owners of a sound recording a cause
of action in any case where a digital dissemination was characterized
purely as a performance - something the current Copyright Act does
not do.
The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act also at-
tempts to distinguish a digital performance from a reproduction or dis-
tribution.182 Where the "reproduction or distribution of a phonorecord
is incidental to the transmission" the transmission may be properly
characterized as a performance. 183 What is incidental is likely to
cause confusion in the future. However, the Act will be a valuable
asset to sound recording owners if the future of music distribution
does gravitate toward digital transmission. The passage of this new
law appears likely.
V. ASCERTAINING THE PROPER DEFENDANT
Even if statutory or case law makes it clear that digital dissemina-
tion of music on the Internet does implicate the Copyright Act, rights
holders may not be able to recover for infringement of their works.
This is because it may be difficult, or impossible, to determine who is
responsible for on-line infringement of copyrighted works. The direct
infringers are often home users, and they may be impossible to find.
Internet communication is largely anonymous. The on-line services
may be much easier to find, but they may not be legally responsible
for the actions of their customers. Thus, the true challenge to the
copyright owner may not be determining which rights have been in-
fringed, but rather determining the proper defendant.18 4
180. Id.
181. Id. § 2(3).
182. Id. § 4(3).
183. Id.
184. At least one commentator believes that third-party liability should apply where an on-
line service has exercised "willful blindness" to the infringing activities of its users. M. Kelly
Tillery, Esq, Protecting Intellectual Property in the Entertainment Industries, Lecture at the
Thompson & Thompson Seminar: Current Intellectual Property Issues (June 21, 1995) ("They
can't just throw up their arms and say 'we're just a conduit.' ").
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A. Direct Infringement
The Copyright Act provides that an infringer is anyone who vio-
lates one of the exclusive rights enumerated in § 106.185 Even inno-
cent, or accidental, infringements are actionable under the Copyright
Act.' Thus, even though most Internet users may know nothing
about copyright law,' 87 they may be held liable for making unauthor-
ized transfers of digitized music. Also, copyright infringement occurs
whenever an unauthorized copy or phonorecord is made, even if it is
used solely for the private purposes of the reproducer.' 88 Further, in-
fringement may occur through the reproduction of only one copy of a
protected work.'8 9
Generally, the subscribers to an on-line service who upload files
onto the bulletin board are required to agree that they have the right to
do so.' 90 But, it may not be realistic to expect on-line users to con-
sider the copyright implications each time they upload or download a
file.' 9 ' As Edward Cavazos, attorney and author of Cyberspace and
the Law' 92 points out, "[a] lot of people play fast and loose on the
'net, grabbing things that are copyrighted, moving them around, giv-
ing them to friends, bringing them to work. As the 'net becomes more
multimedia-oriented, problems arise with text scanned in from print
publications, audio clips, video clips."' 93
Although persons who make unauthorized uploads and
downloads of copyrighted works are clearly direct infringers, it may
be difficult to identify such infringers and to recover damages from
them. 194 There has been very little precedent on the issue of unauthor-
185. Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as
provided by sections 106 through 118 or of the author as provided in section
106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in viola-
tion of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the
case may be.
17 U.S.C. § 501(a).
186. Pinkham v. Sara Lee Corp., 983 F.2d 824, 829 (8th Cir. 1992). See, e.g., Coleman v.
ESPN, Inc., 764 F.Supp. 290, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
187. Slater, supra note 11.
188. NimMER, supra note 108, § 8.02[C] (citing Walt Disney Prods. v. Filmation Assocs.,
628 F.Supp 871, 876 (C.D. Cal. 1986)).
189. Id. § 8.02[D].
190. Terry, supra note 4.
191. Paul, supra note 5.
192. Forthcoming from MIT Press.
193. Slater, supra note 11.
194. Jonathan Gilbert, Computer Bulletin Board Operator Liability for User Misuse, 54
FoRDHAM L. Rav. 439, 441 (1985). In discussing misuse in the form of both copyright infringe-
ment and defamation, Gilbert states:
Though liability for harm caused by bulletin board misuse should lie primarily
with the originator of the message rather than the computer bulletin board opera-
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ized use of copyrighted works on the Internet,195 but so far the trend
has been to ignore the direct infringers and sue the bulletin board and/
or the on-line server. For example, in Frank Music v. CompuServe,
the plaintiff music publisher said that it was not going to use its re-
sources to find the person responsible when it could instead go after
Compuserve, which plaintiffs considered a deep pocket. 196 The extent
to which third party on-line services and bulletin board operators may
be liable for the copyright infringement committed by their subscrib-
ers' 97 is discussed in the next section.
B. Third-Party Liability for On-line Copyright Infringement
It is not necessary for a party to have directly infringed a copy-
right in order to be liable. 198 Such an infringer may be liable under a
theory of third-party liability. Third-party liability can be based either
on a theory of vicarious liability or contributory infringement. The
first part of this section will explore the elements that give rise to
those theories of liability and their application to unauthorized digital
dissemination. The second part will discuss the extent to which either
an on-line server or BBS may be appropriately charged under these
theories of liability.199
The Copyright Act does not specifically provide for third-party
liability. However, the absence of such a provision does not rule out
the possibility that, in appropriate cases, parties who have not them-
selves infringed a copyright may nonetheless be found liable. 00
Many copyright cases have found defendants liable under theories of
tor... who innocently distributes the message, imposition of some liability on the
operator should be considered both as a source of compensation for victims and as
a means of deterring misuse. (Footnote omitted).
195. Cf. Slater, supra note 11 (citing Edward Cavazos, attorney and author of Cyberspace
and the Law) ("You can expect this stuff [copyright infringement] ... to start hitting the fan over
the next few years.").
196. No. 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 29, 1993); Curry, supra note 2.
197. Leeds, supra note 92 ("On-line services have said that responsibility for enforcing
copyrights lies with the owner of a work, not the bulletin board on which it is posted. Some ...
ask subscribers to agree not to redistribute copyrighted material and not to post such work on
public forums.!).
198. Nimmni, supra note 108, § 12.04[A][3][a] ("lit is permissible for a plaintiff to name
as a defendant solely a contributory infringer or one vicariously liable, such as in circumstances
where the direct infringer is not subject to service of process or is unknown."). E.g., Danjaq,
S.A., v. MGMIUA Communications Co., 773 F.Supp. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
199. This discussion is limited to a situation involving a single BBS and a single on-line
server. It is possible that one BBS is made available by another BBS, and so on, constituting a
far more complicated scenario of possible defendants. The more complex the chain of electronic
communication, the more difficult it becomes to determine who along the chain has enough
control over the BBS content to be held liable for infringing material.
200. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 464 (1984).
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third-party liability.20 1 Vicarious liability is a theory that overlays
many areas of law and in the copyright context, is often referred to as
contributory infringement.20 2
When a party has the right and ability to supervise an activity,
with an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of
copyrighted materials, vicarious liability will attach.20 3 Therefore,
third-party liability may be applied to the Internet access providers,
people who retransmit the messages and files their subscribers place
on line.204
1. Vicarious Liability and Contributory Infringement
Vicarious liability may apply in situations that do not involve an
employer-employee relationship.205 Even in the absence of an em-
ployer-employee relationship one may be liable as a related defendant
if he has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activities and
also has a direct financial interest in such activities.20 ' For example,
in Dreamland Ballroom v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. ,207 the defendant
operated a dance hall and hired an orchestra to perform there. The
orchestra was hired as an independent contractor and selected all of its
own music, including selections that infringed plaintiff's copyright.208
The defendant was found liable for the infringement of the hired
orchestra because it hired the orchestra and stood to make a profit
from its performance. 20 9 The only clear reason the Dreamland court
gave for finding liability was the defendant's financial interest. In
other cases, however, mere financial interest, absent the ability to su-
pervise the direct infringer, has not yielded third-party liability.210
An on-line server or BBS operator may not be able to inspect
each posting that subscribers make, though there is clearly a financial
interest in operating these services. Therefore, it may be difficult to
establish vicarious liability for an on-line server that has hundreds of
bulletin boards, each containing thousands of postings. The operator
of a smaller bulletin board, on the other hand, may be able to exercise
the supervision and control necessary to give rise to vicarious liability.
201. NImMaR, supra note 108, § 12.04[A].
202. Sony, 464 U.S. at 435.
203. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
204. Slater, supra note 11.
205. NnMMER, supra note 108, § 12.04[A][1].
206. Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n, Inc., 554
F.2d 1213 (1st Cir. 1977). See generally NmrviaR, supra note 108, § 12.04[A].
207. 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929); See generally Nii ma, supra note 108, § 12.04[A][1].
208. 36 F.2d 355.
209. Id.
210. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Behulak, 651 F.Supp. 57 (M.D. Fla. 1986).
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The theory of vicarious liability stems from the tort doctrine of
respondeat superior. Another theory, that of contributory infringe-
ment, stems instead from the theory of enterprise liability.2 Contrib-
utory infringement liability may attach to a party who "with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another." '212 Under this the-
ory, where a licensee, such as a subscriber to an on-line service, vio-
lates the copyright of a third party, the licensor or service may be held
liable as a contributory infringer.21 3 If an on-line service gives an in-
effective warning - or no warning at all - concerning copyright
infringement, an on-line service may be giving a de facto license to
their subscribers to upload and download copyrighted files. Further,
maintaining bulletin boards known to contain copyrighted works, in
addition to allowing computer users to download from those bulletin
boards freely, may constitute furnishing copyrighted works and the
facilities necessary to infringe:
But what if the one who furnishes a copyrighted work to another
also makes available facilities whereby an infringing copy of the
work may be made, and such person knows or reasonably should
know that the other person intends to make an infringing copy by
use of such facilities? The fact that the infringing activity is not
done under the direction or supervision of the person furnishing
facilities, nor for such person's benefit, albeit a defense against
vicarious liability, does not necessarily immunize him from liabil-
ity as a contributory infringer.214
An on-line service may argue that it is not responsible for the
information carried over its lines, much like the phone company,
which is afforded common carrier immunity.215 CompuServe, for ex-
ample, claims that the amount of information transmitted by its sub-
scribers every week is too voluminous to be adequately reviewed for
copyright infringement without affecting the cost of the service. 21 6
211. NTiMER, supra note 108, § 12.04[A][2] (citing Demetriades v. Kaufrnann, 690 F.Supp.
289, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)).
212. Id. (citing Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). See also Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 362, 365 (1 1th Cir. 1987).
213. NIMMER, supra note 108, § 12.04[A][2][a] (citing Northern Music Corp. v. King Rec-
ord Distrib. Co., 105 F.Supp 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)).
214. Id. § 12.04[A][2][b] (emphasis added).
215. Benjamin R. Seecof, Scanning into the Future of Copyrightable Images: Computer-
Based Image Processing Poses a Present Threat, 5 HIGH TECH. W. 371, 379 (1990). Cf. Gil-
bert, supra note 194, at 442-44 (stating that it can be argued that because a bulletin board service
operator has little contact with the materials that its users are uploading, those operators, like
telephone and telegraph operators, should be afforded constitutional protection as are other
media).
216. Woo, supra note 156.
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On-line services also argue that their liability should be measured
from the point that they are notified of the violation.217 However,
there may be instances where the nature of the digitized musical work
itself should put the on-line service on notice of its unauthorized na-
ture. A major-label release by a popular artist is unlikely to be offered
free-of-charge, in its entirety, on a computer bulletin board.21
Copyright owners may attempt to bring contributory infringe-
ment actions against on-line services in cases where it is difficult, or
impossible, to enforce copyrights against the individual users.219 Yet,
if on-line services are to be held liable for contributory infringement
there must be a causal relationship between the direct infringement by
the home computer user and the service's conduct - unlike vicarious
liability.220 This may make a contributory infringement case more
difficult to prove than a vicarious liability case. However, on-line
services might be seen both as facilitating home users' direct infringe-
ment by providing the necessary equipment and as authorizing such
use by allowing infringement to take place. If so, a contributory in-
fringement claim may be successful.
It appears that whether third-party liability will attach is largely a
question of fact: did the BBS or on-line service have sufficient control
of the use of copyrighted works by their subscribers, and did their
failure to exercise control amount to a de facto authorization of in-
fringing use? An on-line server or BBS can argue that they simply do
not exercise sufficient control over the content of their bulletin boards
to be either vicariously or contributorily liable. If that is true, given
the practical inability to identify and recover from an individual sub-
scriber, copyright owners will have no recourse for infringement of
their works on the Internet. It will be up to the courts to determine
under what circumstances it is appropriate for a third party to be liable
for copyright infringement on-line. A copyright holder will have no
remedy, in many circumstances, if actual knowledge of the infringe-
217. Id.
218. Gilbert, supra note 194, at 443. Cf Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi
Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (Where a "radio station broadcast advertise-
ments for a record that contained songs that had been included without the copyright holder's
permission.... [tihe plaintiff copyright holder argued that the low advertised price of the record
should have put the radio station on notice of the record's infringing nature.").
219. A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory Copyright Infringement: The Tort and Technological
Tensions, 64 NoT DAME L. REv. 47, 50 (1989) (observing that the doctrine of contributory
infringement may avoid the difficulty of suing individual infringers) ("The availability of a con-
tributory infringement action may provide copyright owners with a potent weapon to enforce
their copyrights against unauthorized copying by owners of copy equipment within their own
homes or offices.").
220. Id. at 53.
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ment is required before third-party liability will attach. A sparse se-
lection of case law now populates what surely will become a well-
worn area of litigation in the future.
2. On-line Service and BBS liability: The Case Law
To date, no reported case has directly confronted the issue of un-
authorized dissemination of musical works on the Internet. However,
a few cases have taken up the issue of on-line service and BBS liabil-
ity for user misuse. Two New York cases, Cubby v. CompuServe22
and Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy,22 2 have addressed the problem
of on-line service liability for defamation committed by users.
Although these rulings do not directly bear on the copyright issue,
they may provide helpful insight into on-line service liability gener-
ally. Two on-line copyright infringement cases have been reported,
though neither involved infringement of musical works. In the Florida
case of Playboy Enterprises v. Frena223 the defendant BBS operator
was sued for the unauthorized copying of plaintiff's copyrighted pho-
tographs, which were being uploaded and downloaded by the system's
users. In Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPIHA,224 a California case, the
accused BBS actually encouraged its users to copy plaintiffs copy-
righted computer games. The first case to specifically address on-line
infringement of musical works, Frank Music Corp. v. CompuServe
Inc.,225 will also be discussed, although it appears that the case will
settle without a judicial decision. This brief examination of the lim-
ited precedent in this area may help discern what conduct by an on-
line server or BBS operator will give rise to third-party infringement
liability.
a. Cubby v. CompuServe and Stratton Oakmont
In a defamation action, third-party liability takes the form of re-
publisher liability. That is, republishing the libelous statements of an-
other will render the republisher just as liable as the originator of the
offending material.226 However, if one is merely a distributor of the
offending material, as opposed to a publisher, liability will only attach
if the accused had, or should of had, knowledge of the offending con-
tent.227 In Cubby, the plaintiff brought an action against on-line server
221. 776 F.Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
222. 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.Sup.) (reprinted at 23 MEDIA L. REP. 1794).
223. 839 F.Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
224. 857 F.Supp 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
225. No. 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D.N.Y filed Nov. 29, 1993).
226. Cianci v. New Times Pub. Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (1979).
227. Oalanont, 1995 WL 323710, *2.
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CompuServe and the operator of one of its bulletin boards,
Rumorville. The defendants were granted summary judgment on
charges of libel, business disparagement, and unfair competition,
stemming from the allegedly false and defamatory statements made on
the Rumorville BBS concerning plaintiffs' rival BBS Skuttlebut.
Clearly the issues involved in a defamation claim are very different
than those in copyright infringement. However, the result of Cubby
helps to illustrate the respective roles of an on-line service and a BBS.
CompuServe argued that "as a distributor of... [the BBS], it
cannot be held liable on the libel claim because it neither knew nor
had reason to know of the allegedly defamatory statements."228 It was
the plaintiffs' contention that the court should conclude that
CompuServe is a publisher of the statements and hold it to a higher
standard of liability.229 Likewise, the Rumorville BBS argued it also
acted merely as a distributor, and not a publisher.230
In essence, the plaintiffs' arguments rested on two theories. The
first theory is that CompuServe was directly liable for the defamation
because they republished the allegedly defamatory statements that ap-
peared on the BBS. The court noted that the republisher of defama-
tory matter will be liable just as if it were the originator of the
offending material. 231  However, the court went on to point out that
"New York courts have long held that vendors and distributors of de-
famatory publications are not liable if they neither know nor have rea-
son to know of the defamation. 232
CompuServe is, in the court's view, essentially an "electronic,
for-profit library that carries a vast number of publications and col-
lects usage and membership fees from its subscribers in return for ac-
cess to the publications." z 3 Accordingly, CompuServe should not be
liable if it did not have knowledge of the BBS's defamatory con-
tent.234 The court held that "the appropriate standard of liability to be
applied to CompuServe is whether it knew or had reason to know of
the allegedly defamatory [BBS] . . . statements."235 In Cubby, the
court found that the on-line server did not have such knowledge.
Secondly, the plaintiffs asserted that CompuServe should be vi-
cariously liable for the statements on the Rumorville BBS:
228. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F.Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
229. Id. at 139.
230. Id. at 138.
231. Id. at 139 (citation omitted).
232. Id. (citation omitted).
233. Id. at 140.
234. Id. at 141.
235. Id. at 140-41.
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Plaintiffs also argue that CompuServe may be held vicariously lia-
ble for the allegedly defamatory Rumorville statements, based on
an agency relationship between CompuServe, CCI, and DFA.
CompuServe contends that... at most, DFA is an independent
contractor... of CompuServe, so that it may not be held vicari-
ously liable for the statements that appeared in Rumorville.236
The court stated that "[i]n order for an employer to be held vicar-
iously liable for the tort of an independent contractor, the employer
must have directed the act from which the injury resulted or have
taken an affirmative, active part in its commission. 237 Clearly Com-
puServe did not direct Rumorville to post defamatory statements about
plaintiffs' BBS. Thus, plaintiffs' agency theory failed and, because
this is not a case of copyright infringement, the less stringent standard
of contributory infringement is not available. The Cubby court held
that the BBS was not an agent of CompuServe, rather their function
was more like that of an independent contractor.238
The Oakmont case offers a contrasting, though consistent, ruling.
Though factually similar to Cubby, the defendant in Oakmont was
found to be a publisher, and therefore liable for the defamatory post-
ings of its users. The reason for the different result was that the de-
fendant, Prodigy, exercised editorial control over the content of their
service - unlike CompuServe.239  Prodigy did so by setting out
guidelines for content on its bulletin boards, employing a special con-
tent-screening software to remove unwanted messages, and employing
BBS leaders to monitor the content.240
The Oakmont and Cubby decisions raise the prospect that on-line
services will only be liable for defamatory postings if they have, or
should have, knowledge of the offending content. This standard might
be borrowed from defamation law and applied in on-line copyright
infringement cases also. However, knowledge is not an element of
copyright infringement. 241 Further, the Oakmont decision provides
on-line services with the incentive not to monitor the content of their
services.242 For both of these reasons, extension of a knowledge stan-
236. Id. at 142.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 143.
239. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy, 1995 WL 323710, *3 (N.Y. Sup.).
240. Id. at *1-2.
241. Playboy Enterprises v. Frena, 839 F.Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
242. 1995 WL 323710, *4 (However, the court argues that any such concerns assume that
the market will not support the added expense of a service that exercises content control, which
may be of value to a certain segment of the population.).
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dard beyond the defamation cases may not be appropriate, and in the
Playboy case, the court refuses to do so.
b. Playboy Enterprises v. Frenaz43
Unlike Cubby and Oaknont, Playboy concerns copyright in-
fringement and therefore may offer a closer analogy to a situation in
which an unauthorized dissemination of digitized music is the subject
of litigation. In Playboy, the defendant bulletin board operator was
found liable for violating the plaintiff's exclusive right to distribute
and exclusive right to display its copyrighted photographs. Unable to
identify the party responsible for posting the photographs, the plaintiff
sued the bulletin board operator. 2'
The defendant, Frena, stated by way of affidavit that, although
his customers had uploaded infringing material, he had never done so
himself.24  The court found this fact to be irrelevant.246 If the defend-
ant bulletin board "supplied a product containing unauthorized copies
of a copyrighted work," the court reasoned, "it does not matter that
[the defendant] claims he did not make the copies ... [him]self."24 7
Nor was the court convinced by Frena's claim that he was unaware of
the copyright infringement. Neither intent nor knowledge are require-
ments of a copyright infringement cause of action, and "thus even an
innocent infringer is liable for infringement."248
In Playboy the defendant BBS operator was found liable for di-
rect copyright infringement, not third-party liability. Though the court
does not discuss it, the facts indicate that this was a fairly small BBS
and the operator was aware of the contents - even if not their infring-
ing nature.249 It is not clear, however, at what point in a BBS's
growth it contains so many subscriber postings that the operator may
not be deemed directly liable for infringing postings. May'such a BBS
still be open to third-party liability by virtue of their overall control of
the BBS? Further, at what point are the postings so beyond the opera-
tor's control as to preclude any liability at all? Until more cases are
heard on these issues, these distinctions will remain undefined. What
does seem clear, at least in the following case, is that when an on-line
243. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
244. Sugawara, supra note 7.
245. 839 F.Supp. at 1554; see also Proprietary Rights, supra note 113.
246. 839 F.Supp. at 1559.
247. Id. at 1556.
248. Id. at 1559.
249. Id. at 1554 (The defendant never denied that the photos were displayed on his
service.).
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service or BBS actually encourages its users to infringe, liability will
attach.
c. Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPHA250
Unlike Cubby, Oakmont, or Playboy, in Sega the defendant bulle-
tin board actively solicited and encouraged its subscribers to trade un-
authorized copies of plaintiff's computer games over defendant's
BBS. The evidence "indicate[d] the defendant specifically solicited
this copying and expressed the desire that these video game programs
be placed on the MAPHIA bulletin board for downloading pur-
poses." 25' The court found that MAPHIA had induced and materially
contributed to the infringing conduct of the subscribers. Because de-
fendant provided the facilities, and even instructions, necessary to
make unauthorized copies of plaintiff's computer games, they were
found liable for contributory infringement.2 s2
Interestingly, the Sega court cites Playboy for this proposition.
The Playboy court did not rest its decision on contributory infringe-
ment, finding instead direct infringement. What does seem similar in
the two cases is the defendants' close relationship to either the infring-
ing material, as in Playboy, or the infringing subscribers, as in Sega.
When such a close link is established, whether the infringement theory
is direct or contributory may not be important. In Playboy the theory
was direct, though the defendant did not clearly encourage the activ-
ity. In Sega the defendant appears to directly encourage the infringe-
ment, though the theory is contributory infringement. However, if
such a close connection is absent, and the defendant neither knew, nor
should have known, of the infringing material, a plaintiff may be com-
pelled to rest on a theory of vicarious liability.2 3
d. Frank Music Corp. v. CompuServe 4
In what has justifiably been touted as the first case of its kind,2 -
music publisher Frank Music has filed suit against CompuServe
250. sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F.Supp. 682 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
251. Id. at 683.
252. Id. at 686-87.
253. In which case the elements of financial interest and ability to control need to be shown.
254. Frank Music Corp. v. CompuServe, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 29,
1993).
255. [A]s long as no one is making money out of them, the copyright owners have
been content to turn a blind eye or accept the near impossibility of policing the
patch. But Frank Music, in an action backed by the US National Music Publishers
Association, has decided to target CompuServe over the $50,000... the organisa-
tion made last year on downloading music.
Curry, supra note 2.
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claiming copyright infringement of hundreds of songs within the
Frank Music catalog. CompuServe "is engaged in the business of
maintaining a computer-based on-line information and electronic com-
munication service which involves Compuserve's maintenance of a
large mainframe computer and the database contained therein consist-
ing of literary, graphic and musical material. 256 One of the bulletin
boards provided by CompuServe is the MlDI/Music Forum, which
specializes in the digital dissemination of music via the Internet.
The Frank Music suit is a class action on behalf of the more than
140257 music publisher-principals of The Harry Fox Agency, Inc.258
According to the complaint, in excess of 550,259 compositions in their
catalog were "the subject of recordings which were uploaded and
downloaded to and from Compuserve's Bulletin Board by Com-
puserve's subscribers. 260  The complaint alleges that plaintiff's
works were infringed more than 690 times, and asks for $100,000 in
statutory damages under the Copyright Act for each of the 690 acts, in
addition to a preliminary and permanent injunction.26 1 The plaintiff's
complaint states in relevant part:
Compuserve, in providing access to its Bulletin Board (in particular
its 'MIDI/Music Forum' and various 'libraries' therein) by its pay-
ing subscribers, is... engaged in the following activities with re-
spect to the Frank Work and the Class Compositions:
A. permitting... the recording of performances of the Frank
Work and the Class Compositions into, and storing such re-
cordings in, Compuserve's computer database by permitting
and enabling its paying subscribers to upload such perform-
ances thereto;
B. maintaining a storage of unauthorized recordings of The
Frank Work and Class Compositions (uploaded by its sub-
scribers) in and as part of Compuserve's computer database,
and
C. permitting... the recording ... of the performances of
The Frank Work and the Class Compositions... by permit-
ting and enabling its paying subscribers to download such re-
corded performances therefrom. 262
256. Plaintiff's Complaint, Frank Music, supra note 32, at 3.
257. Id. at 2.
258. Id. at 1.
259. Id. at 5.
260. Id.
261. Id at 8.
262. Id. at 6-7.
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The injunctive relief sought by Frank Music is for CompuServe
to "purge its computer database of those files from which copies of
phonorecords of performances of the Frank Work . . . can be
made. 263
In its defense, CompuServe claims, first, that it is akin to a new-
stand, bookstore or. library, and is therefore not liable.264 Counsel for
CompuServe is relying, in part, on the Cubby decision and its finding
that an on-line service was not a republisher of defamatory content
uploaded by its users.265 CompuServe's second defense is that "it is
not responsible for any copyright violations because the music forum
is managed by a third party."266 To this second argument, the Frank
complaint asserts that CompuServe "could have determined" the con-
tent of its bulletin board, and that the infringing works were uploaded,
stored in, and downloaded from its database.267
The Frank Music case does not appear to parallel the close rela-
tionship between on-line service and offending material (or direct in-
fringers) found in either Playboy or Sega. For this reason, it seems
unlikely that Frank Music will succeed on a direct infringement the-
ory. Also, contributory infringement may be difficult to establish be-
cause it does not appear that CompuServe encouraged infringement of
plaintiff's copyrighted works. Frank Music's assertion that Com-
puServe "could have determined" the infringing nature of its BBS's
contents may imply that, combined with CompuServe's financial in-
terest, vicarious liability is appropriate.
As of July 1995, the Frank Music case appeared to be moving
towards a settlement.268 If the case is settled without a judicial deci-
sion, the issue of CompuServe's liability may be left undetermined. It
seems clear, however, that the primary issue in litigation over the un-
authorized dissemination of digitized music over the Internet is the
263. The [Frank] case may also involve the interpretation of the Audio Home Re-
cording Act of 1992. Section 1008 of the Copyright Act, for example, exempts
from copyright infringement liability the noncommercial home taping of copy-
righted musical works, including the making of digital musical recordings. Man-
ufacturers and distributors of digital audio recording devices and media are
exempt from contributory infringement liability.... It is unlikely that the Audio
Home Recording Act will be found to exempt Compuserve from direbt, contribu-
tory, or vicarious infringement liability.
CopYRIHT L. J., Aug.-Sept., 1994, at 58.
264. Terry, supra note 4.
265. ErT. LIG. REP., supra note 36. See supra part V.B.2.a.
266. Id. See also Terry, supra note 4 ("Jim Maki, the independent contractor who runs
Compuserve's MIDI/Music Forum, also pleads innocent.").
267. Plaintiff's Complaint, Frank Music, supra note 32, at 7.
268. Traiman, supra note 18. Gillen, Precedent Set, supra note 142 ('There appears to be
movement toward a settlement of the dispute among the parties involved.').
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extent to which the defendant can control the content and use of its
services. Determination of that issue will have possibly determinative
impact on the outcome of such cases. If direct or contributory in-
fringement is charged, a determination will likely hinge on the close-
ness of the relationship between the defendant and the direct
infringers, or the defendant and the infringing material. On the other
hand, if vicarious liability is asserted, the mere ability to supervise,
coupled with a financial interest, may yield third-party liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Internet has been called an "inherently anarchistic place
where copyright doesn't apply.' 2 69 To a certain extent that is clearly
true. The technological developments in electronic communication
are speeding along at a pace that may cause many copyright holders to
feel threatened - fearing the current copyright law is not sufficient
protection for their copyrighted works once they are released into
cyberspace. That fear is not unfounded. The dissemination of digi-
tized music on the Internet is widespread, and services totally devoted
to such dissemination are multiplying and expanding. Also expanding
is the ability of on-line services to deliver higher quality digitized mu-
sic in less and less time.
The Copyright Act, however, is not made obsolete by recent
technological developments in this area. The exclusive rights granted
by the Act cover many, if not all, aspects of digital dissemination of
music and other works. Granted, the Act could be amended to clearly
encompass the new forms of reproduction, distribution, and perform-
ance of musical works - forms made available by new technol-
ogy.270 However, any changes to current copyright law should be
subtle and should avoid shifting the balance currently in place be-
tween the rights of the copyright holders and the public's access to
copyrighted works.
269. Tam, supra note 11 (quoting Rob Lord of the Independent Underground Music
Archive) ("The Net is too beautiful a place. It's a cooperative, anarchistic system. The values
that the music industry tries to superimpose onto the Intemet don't apply.").
270. See generally McCoy & Boddie, supra note 16.
Federal copyright law has shown remarkable resilience over the years. Its flexibil-
ity has accommodated technological advances while balancing the constitutional
directive of protecting authors and promoting the arts. The [Green Paper's] pro-
posed revisions have started the important discussion of how to ensure that copy-
right law continues to balance the rights of authors and the interests of society in
access to authors' works.
Id. at 194.
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It is this comment's position that the main problem in enforcing
copyright laws in cyberspace is not any inadequacy of the Copyright
Act, but instead identifying the responsible parties. Clearly it is im-
practical for a copyright holder to track down every individual on-line
subscriber that has made an unauthorized transfer of digitized music.
Conversely, it is not possible for large on-line services to inspect
every file that is placed onto a bulletin board.
The question of responsibility hinges on the closeness of the rela-
tionship between the on-line service, the infringing parties, and the
infringing works. This is a question of fact. Future cases will need to
delineate clearly the lines of responsibility for copyright infringement
on the Internet. This is necessary so that copyright holders will feel
secure in using this new technology to reach more and more people
with their works, and computer users will have access to these creative
works, within the reasonable bounds of copyright law.
